Author: s1573845
Seminar: Real Definition, Ground, and The Planning Theory of Law – David Plunkett (Dartmouth College)
Seminar: Vagueness and Normativity in Legal Language and the Law – Alex Silk (Birmingham)
Seminar: Some Helpful Misconceptions about Informed Consent – Beth Henzel (Rutgers)
Seminar: General Jurisprudence as Descriptive Metaphysics – Dominic Alford-Duguid (KCL)
Seminar: Between Union and Devolution: The Structure of the British Parliament in Comparative Perspective – Nicholas Aroney (University of Queesnsland)
Seminar: What is the One-System View? An Analysis of Dworkin’s ‘New’ Theory of Law – Hillary Nye (LSE)
Seminar: The Right to Housing – Katy Wells (Oxford)
Seminar: Presumptions and Burdens of Proof in Ordinary Argumentation – Lilian Bermejo-Luque (Granada)
Abstract: Presuming that p is not the same as maintaining that presumably p. I argue that, in presuming that p, we make a presumption, whereas in maintaining that presumably p, we draw the conclusion of a presumptive inference. I provide an account of the correctness conditions for presumptions and presumptive inferences by characterizing presumptions as a type of constative speech-act having certain semantic correctness conditions and by dealing with the correctness conditions for the use of an epistemic modal such as “presumably.” Such an epistemic modal is characterized as the force indicator for a speech-act of concluding involving a presumptive inference.